UPHOLDING VALIDITY

DECONSTRUCTING LEGALESE OF DEMONETISATION 2016



he Supreme Court in he supreme Court in its judgment dated 2.1.2023 upheld the validity of the decision of the incumbent government to demonetise Rs.500 and Rs.1000 currency notes of all denominations on 8.11.2016, by a majority of 4 in a Constitution Bench 4 in a Constitution Bench judgment of 5 judges. The said judgment has cleared the air on several doubts in the minds of the people as to the validity of such a decision having serious consequences on the citiconsequences on the citizen at large. Several issues raised were adjudicated in the course of the judgment in the majority opinion of four Hon'ble Judges who upheld the said decision as being in conformity with re-quirements of Law. The Dissenting opinion addressed the issues arising from in-terpretation of Section 26(2) of the RBI Act, 1934 while

Demonetisation of the currency is a known device used by governments for various reasons primar-ily to regulate black money. The earliest instance of demonetisation was noticed to be in 1873 in the U.S.A. Another instance was in 1969 by President Richard Nixon by President Richard Nixon to combat black money by declaring all currencies over \$100 to be null. Brit-ain in the year 1971 stopped circulation of old currency. Russia, formerly Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in an attempt to combat the parallel economy removed 50 and 100 Rouble Notes from circulation under the leadership of Mikhail Gor-

holding the decision to be

illegal.

India resorted to demonetisation twice before 08.11.2016, first instance was on 12 January, 1946 and the second was on 16 January, 1978. In fact the Demonetisation done in 1978 was challenged as being violative of Fundamental Rights and the same was rejected by the Hon'ble Su-preme Court vide its judge-ment reported in Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah, Devkumar Gopaldas Aggarwal vs. Reserve Bank of India. The time granted for exchange of demonetised notes was

was upheld by the Supreme Court as being reasonable for "it was absolutely nec essary to ensure that no opportunity was available to the holders of high de nomination banknotes to nomination banknotes to transfer the same to the pos-session of others." The De-monetisation announced on 8th November 2016 was ef-fectively the third instance of demonetisation underof demonetisation under-taken in India, wherein 52 days were allowed for ex-change of any amount of de-monetised currency notes. The objectives cited in the notification published in the Gazette by the Central Government in exercise of Government in exercise of power under section 26(2) of the RBI Act, 1934 are, a) percolation of fake currency notes in the denominations of Rs.500/- and Rs.1000/-; b) High denomination cur rency notes are used for storage of unaccounted wealth and c) fake currenc wealth, and c) take currency is being used for financing subversive activities such as drug trafficking and terrorism, causing damage to the economy and security of the Country

The Constitution Bench of The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was unanimous in so far as holding that the decision of the Central Government was justified and in the interest of the nation. Infact terest of the nation. Infact the following observation in the Dissenting opinion acknowledges this fact in no uncertain terms, "22. Before parting, I wish to observe that demoneti-sation was an initiative of

sation was an initiative of

the Central Government,

and authority vesting in the

Central Government to take

the decision to demonetise

high denomination curren-

high denomination curren-cy notes for the objectives set out to be achieved.

The limited area of dis-sent was firstly, whether a simple Notification under

Section 26(2) of the RBI Act,

1934 was adequate or a Leg

1934 was adequate or a Leg-islation was required to ex-ercise such power. Secondly, if the RBI could have recom-mended to demonetise 'all' series of notes of specified denominations when the relevant provision of sec-

tion 26(2) uses the word 'any" series of bank notes of

any denomination.

The manner of exercise of power is where the Dissenting Opinion comes to the

conclusion that the Central

Government could not have

initiated the process of seek-

initiated the process of seek-ing a recommendation from the RBI under sub-section 2 of Section 26. As the recom-mendation was at the behest of the Central Government

it has been held to be legally

flawed, being not indepen-dent exercise of statutory

dent exercise of statutory power by the Central Board of RBI. According to the majority view the factum of Minis-try of Finance writing a let-

ter on 7th November, 2016

would not alter the nature

of power conferred under

targeted to address distargeted to address dis-parate evils, plaguing the Nation's economy, includ-ing, practices of hoarding "black" money, counterfeit-ing, which in turn enable even greater evils, including terror funding, drug ing terror funding, drug trafficking, emergence of a parallel economy, money laundering including Hav-ala transactions. It is be-yond pale of doubt that the said measure, which was aimed at eliminating these deprayed practices, was well-intentioned. The mea sure is reflective of concern for the economic health and security of the country and demonstrates foresight. At no point has any suggestion been made that the measure was motivated by anything but the best intentions and noble objects for the bet-terment of the Nation. The measure has been regarded as unlawful only on a purely legalistic analysis of the relSection 26(2) on the Central Board, as the process contemplated therein reof the notification in the Ga zette are both duly complied with. The scope of judicial review specially in mat-ters of economic policy is very limited in view of the settled law by way of several pronouncements of the eme Court on the issue November, 2016, the major the RB and the Central Government were in con-sultation with each other for a period of six months before the impugned no-tification was issued. The record would also reveal that all the relevant infor-mation was shared by who

quired a recommendation by the RBI and publication zette are both duly complied The majority further opined The majority further opined even experts can seriously err and doubtlessly differ". In fact upon perusal of the entire record pertaining to the said decision making process, i.e., communica-tion dated 7th November, 2016, 8th November, 2016 and the minutes of the Cen-tral Board 561st Meeting as well as the Note for the Cab-inet for consideration of the Cabinet Meeting dated 8th ity arrived at the conclusion ity arrived at the conclusion that relevant factors had been taken into consider-ation. Further, the majority returns a finding that "..the record itself reveals that the RBI and the Central

mation was shared by both

the Central Board as well

as the Central Government

with each other. As such, it cannot be said that there was no conscious, effective, meaningful and purposeful consultation". On this issue the Dissent-

On this issue the Dissent-ing opinion lays emphasis on the language used in the letter dated 7th November, 2016 addressed to the Gov-ernor of the RBI, the draft memorandum of the Dep uty Governor of the Bank placed before the Board which records that 'the Gov which records that 'the Gov-ernmenthad recommended' withdrawal of existing Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 notes. Further, reliance is placed on the Deputy Governor, RBI letter to the Central Government dated 8th No vember, 2016, wherein it is stated that the proposal of the Central Government was placed before the Cen-tral Board of the Bank in its 561st meeting and that necessary recommendation to proceed with the said pro oosal had been 'obtained'

from the Central Board of the Bank.

The second issue of diver-gence is on the interpretation of the expression "any series of bank notes of any denomination" could en compass 'all series of bank notes of any denomination'.
According to the majority opinion the expression 'any' in the context would 'any' in the context would mean 'all' having regard to the context in which it

has been used by applying

the principle of purposive interpretation. In fact the majority also rejected the contention that in 1946 and 1978 plenary power of leg-islation was invoked by the Central Government cannot be the basis for restricting the meaning of 'any' in sub-section (2) of Section 26 to exclude 'all' by confining it

to mean 'some' On this issue, the dissenting opinion interpreted the ing opinion interpreted the said provision by applying the 'plain meaning rule'. According to the dissenting view, the considerations which could guide the Central Government will be 'broad or wide', while considerations which could considerations which could guide the Bank's recom-mendations are "limited or narrow in compass". Ac-cordingly, it was opined that the RBI recommendation shall necessarily have to be of 'any' specified seto be of 'any' specified se-ries and not 'all'. The power to demonetise 'all' notes is vested only in the Central Government by virtue of en-try 36 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitu-tion which of course has to tion which of course has to be exercised by means of a plenary legislation and not by issuance of a gazette no-tification under sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the Act.

The judgement of the Con-stitution Bench has settled the legal issues raised in the context of the demonetisation announced on 8.11. 2016. The dissenting opinion has laid emphasis on the language used in the correspondence 07.11.2016 and 08.11.2016 between the Government and RBI and Government and RBI and has interpreted the same in a manner of interpreting the statute, by highlighting the expressions 'recommended by the Central Commenced' by the Central Government', 'obtained', 'as

desired' referred supra. desired' referred supra. In my opinion the letter 07th November, 2016 from the Central Government can be treated akin to an 'invita-tion of offer' requesting the RBI to consider exercise of its statutory power in ac-cordance with the statutory mandate. The RBI in law re tains its statutory freedom to consider the same and can either act upon it by making a recommendation or refuse to give recommendation for demonetisation by application of its own institutional wisdom independently, as it wisdom independently, as it had declined earlier in 1978. In either case it would still be well within its powers. In a consultative democracy in-stitutions are free to agree or to disagree with each others points of view. In the event of disagreement the Cen-tral Government could still have lawfully gone ahead by invoking its plenary legisla tive powers as it was done in 1978. In the present case as it is disclosed from the affidavits of the Central Govern-

ment as well as the RBI, RBI

was taken into confidence at least six months prior to No-vember 2016. The RBI upon receiving the letter dated 07.11.2016 could have in its wisdom agreed with the views of the Central Governviews of the Central Govern-ment and as was the case on hand and accordingly made the recommendations as it did on 08.11.2016 pursuant to its 561st Board Meeting. In other words in this in stance the Central Government's invitation to offer led RBI to offer its recommen-dation. Statutorily the Cen-tral Government was still free and not bound to accept such a recommendation and it would still have been legal. However, as it transpires the Central Government the Central Government accepted the recommenda-tion, thereby concluding the chain of events while meet-ing the statutory require-ments of Section 26(2).

Further, the majority opinion also acknowledges the need for confidentiality the need for confidentiality in policy making process and records how the events transpired prior to the demonetisation in 1978. The manner in which the consultative process between the Central Government and RBI was kept confiden-tial even in 2016, shows even in the age of RTI, confidentiality in administration of affairs of the State policy making in matters tional importance is legally



MATRIMONIAL DISPUTE

Wife can file for maintenance u/s 125 CrPC even after receiving alimony if unable to maintain herself or children: Punjab and Haryana HC

The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case Sunil Sachdeva v. Rashmi and An-Sachdeva v. Rashmi and An-otherobserved and has stated that a wife can file a plea for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, notwithstanding the fact that the wife already

the fact that the wife already has received a payment of lump sum by way of alimony from her husband. The present case involved a couple who got married in the year 1983. Thus, after the matrinoval dispute between matrimonial dispute between the two, in 1993, they started living separately. However, by way of a written compro-mise which are made in 1993, the husband deposited Rs.3 lac in favour of his wife and two children as full and final alimony settlement with re gards to their past, present and future claims of main

evant provisions of the Act

and not on the objects of

However, the wife filed a ne

The husband aggrieved by this filed the present petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Pro-

tition in 2007 under Section 125 of CrPC for maintenance, which was then eventually being ruled in her favour in being ruled in her favour in 2016 by the Additional Ses-sions Judge, Pathankot, by which ruling the wife was being granted maintenance at the rate of Rs.15,000 per

> judgment of the Additional essions Judge, Pathankot. It has been argued by the petitioner-husband that the

plea filed by wife under Sec-Therefore, the same being the

as the present matter was already being settled between the parties, by way of a writ-ten compromise which was being complied with by the

On the other hand, it has

spondent wife that she was only earning Rs. 17,000 until her retirement in 2018, and that it was not possible for the wife to provide for expenses which includes accommodawhich includes accommoda-tion, water and conveyance, electricity, additionally, since she was being burdened with the expenses of her two chil-dren – both being college students. The Single bench headed by Justice Amarjot Bhatti, while holding that the plea under Section 125 was maintainable, despite the settlement in 1993, stat-ed that it cannot be disputed that it was not being possible for a lady and her two children to survive in a meagre ount of Rs. 3 lacs and it is

not possible to survive in a

meagre salary of Rs.17,000 and to bear the responsibil-ity of her two children who were going in professional colleges. Thus, the wife was to look-after their daily exto look-after their daily ex-penditure, food, clothing, transportation, medical expenditure as and when required and other social obligations. The wife was justified in filing the petition under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure

Accordingly, the bench headed by Justice Bhatti found no justification for interfering of with the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pathankot, wherein providing for maintenance o the wife for an amount of Rs. 15,000 per month